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I. Introduction 
Can an uninformed trader profit from buying and then selling an asset?  Despite 
Friedman’s (1953) conclusion that arbitrage would make such a strategy self-defeating, 
some financial economists have concluded that profitable “trade-based” manipulation is 
feasible.  Allen and Gale (1992) and Aggarwal and Wu (2004) demonstrate the 
possibility of a pooling equilibrium in which the typical trader cannot distinguish 
informed investors and would-be manipulators, allowing the latter to influence prices 
strategically.  Other models rely on investor irrationality or other departures from market 
efficiency.  In Jarrow’s (1992) model, prices have momentum, enabling a manipulator to 
establish a price trend and then profit by trading against it.  Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) 
demonstrate that a trader can exploit investor biases by buying to drive up prices, then 
selling at a profit. 
The harder question is whether profitable trade-based manipulation is common in 
actual asset markets.  Camerer (1998) describes an experimental attempt to manipulate 
prices (odds) in a horse race that failed to generate expected profits.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) brings enforcement actions against alleged manipulators, 
primarily in small and illiquid stocks.  During the internet boom in particular, the SEC 
took action against “pump and dump” schemes in which a trader made large purchases 
(sometimes coupled with the release of false information) and then sold after a price 
increase.1  Aggarwal and Wu (2004) study all stocks involved in SEC anti-manipulation 
enforcement actions from 1990 to 2001 and find that prices, trading volumes, and 
volatility rise during the alleged manipulation and prices fall afterwards, suggesting that 
profitable manipulation could have occurred. 
Outside the limited context of penny stocks and other illiquid markets, the 
evidence of profitable trade-based manipulation is anecdotal.  The most famous alleged 
manipulations are the stock pools of the 1920s, through which groups of investors 
                                                 
1 An example is described in SEC Litigation Release 18137 (2003).  A page on the SEC’s web site 
(http://www.sec.gov/investor/online/pump.htm) is devoted to advising investors on how to spot and avoid 
internet “pump and dump” schemes.  A separate page 
(http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/internetenforce.htm) provides information about SEC enforcement 
actions involving internet fraud or manipulation. 
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actively traded in a specified stock.  The stock pools are the main cause of the current 
anti-manipulation laws in the United States and often motivate academic discussions of 
market manipulation.  The apparent success of the stock pools continues to influence 
regulatory policies, such as SEC rules regarding stabilization during public offerings. 
Mahoney (1999), however, studies the average price behavior of stocks traded by 
pools in 1928 and 1929 and argues that there is little evidence that pools were engaged in 
manipulation.  While these stocks earned positive (but modest) abnormal returns on 
average around the time of pool formation, they did not subsequently earn abnormally 
negative average returns, as would be expected if the pool’s trades artificially inflated 
stock prices. The qualitative evidence regarding pools is also ambiguous.  Pool 
participants routinely testified that they were informed traders or were trading to add 
liquidity.  The Senate’s hearings were polemical and generated little hard evidence of 
manipulation. 
In this paper, we undertake a more comprehensive examination of the pools using 
a much richer set of data, allowing us to study abnormal trading volume as well as 
returns, together with the relationship between them.  In addition to averages, we look at 
the cross-sectional variation in return, turnover, and other measures among the pools.  We 
also study the pool stocks’ long-term abnormal returns.  We discuss how recent findings 
from the theoretical and empirical literature on manipulation can be used in a forensic 
setting in which the qualitative evidence of manipulation is inconclusive, paying 
particular attention to the problem of distinguishing manipulation from informed trading.  
We find that the evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that abnormal returns 
associated with the pools resulted from informed trading rather than successful trade-
based manipulation.  Finally, we note some implications of our study for the enforcement 
of anti-manipulation laws. 
We begin with some basic characteristics of the pool stocks. Aggarwal and Wu 
(2004) find that stocks subject to manipulative trading tend to be small, illiquid, and 
volatile.  In comparison, Maug (2002) shows that an informed trader can most easily 
profit from trades in highly liquid stocks, which provide more opportunities to 
camouflage the informed trades.  We find that the pool stocks are comparable to their 
associated industry portfolios on measures of size and are more volatile and liquid, on 
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average, than other companies in their industry.  During the period of pool activity, the 
pool stocks experience both abnormally high trading volume and return, but both effects 
are small on average.  Average volatility and liquidity both increase during a pool. 
There are also important differences among the pool stocks.  In particular, several 
were formed around the time of seasoned equity (rights) offerings in the subject stock.  
These stocks do not experience abnormally high trading volumes or returns during the 
pool.  
We then investigate the relationship between trading volumes and returns.  Trade-
based manipulation, by definition, proceeds through large trades.  The models in Jarrow 
(1992), Allen & Gale (1992), Aggarwal & Wu (2004) and Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) 
involve would-be manipulators whose trades influence prices.  Informal descriptions of 
manipulation, such as Leffler & Farwell (1963), also focus on the manipulator’s rapid 
accumulation of a large position in the target stock to create a mispricing.  We find a 
strong cross-sectional relationship between abnormal turnover and return around the time 
of pool formation for the non-rights offering pool stocks. 
We also look at the dynamic relationship between turnover and return using the 
framework developed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar & Wang (2002).  In their model, 
returns generated by informed trading tend to continue in the short run whereas returns 
generated by liquidity trading tend to reverse.  We note, however, that return continuation 
in connection with potentially manipulative trading could also be evidence of price 
momentum generated by the manipulator.  We find that the existence of a pool is, on 
average, associated with increased return continuation conditioned on turnover. 
Finally, we investigate the long-term performance of the pool stocks.  Even 
though the positive abnormal returns on the pool stocks are not reversed in the short run, 
we expect that if prices of pool stocks had been manipulated to artificially high levels, 
they would have experienced particularly hard landings during the 1929 stock market 
crash and the Depression.  Indeed, the pool stocks underperform their industry averages 
during the decade beginning in late 1929.  However, the underperformance is entirely 
accounted for by the stocks that were the subject of rights offerings at the time of the 
pool.  The remaining stocks perform almost identically to their industry averages over the 
decade after the pool.  Moreover, we find that the long-term performance is related to 
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book-to-market and other valuation measures prior to the pool but not to the pool’s 
activities. 
In summary, while the pattern of stock price and trading volume could be 
consistent with market manipulation, there is no evidence that the stock pools’ trades 
drove prices to artificially high levels. Therefore, we conclude that public investors were 
not harmed by pool operations.  This finding is notable because Congress devoted 
substantial resources to uncovering evidence of manipulation on the New York Stock 
Exchange during the late 1920s.  It appears, contrary to received wisdom, that this effort 
was unsuccessful.  The size, liquidity, and disclosure standards in that market, although 
modest by current standards, may have been sufficient to protect investors against 
manipulation.  This contrasts with the relatively small and illiquid markets that account 
for the majority of manipulation cases brought by the SEC (Aggarwal and Wu, 2004).  It 
also contrasts with futures markets, in which the supply of the underlying deliverable 
commodity or financial instrument can be cornered, causing severe price distortions 
(Merrick, Naik and Yadav, 2003).  Our results suggest, then, that enforcement resources 
can be focused on discrete segments of the securities markets. 
We also note that it is difficult to reject a hypothesis of informed trading in favor 
of a hypothesis of trade-based manipulation solely by examining short-run trading data.  
As Llorente et al. (2002) demonstrate, informed trading, like manipulation, should result 
in high trading volume followed by abnormally high returns.  Although manipulation, 
unlike informed trading, drives prices to an “artificial” level, the new price level must be 
sustained long enough to permit the manipulator to unwind his position.  Our 
examination of pre-pool characteristics and post-pool long-term returns, therefore, is 
essential to determine whether the allegations of manipulation were warranted.  The 
analytical tests developed in this paper could provide useful forensic tools in 
manipulation cases. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the stock pools 
and Section III describes our data and compares the pool stocks and their associated 
industry portfolios just prior to pool formation.  Section IV describes the average 
abnormal returns and turnover for the pools stocks during pool operations and analyzes 
cross-sectional differences among the pools.  It also analyzes the dynamic relationship 
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between turnover and return before and during the pools. Section V investigates the long-
run returns on the pool stocks.  Section VI concludes. 
II. The Stock Pools 
As described by Mahoney (1999), stock pools consisted of agreements, often 
written, among a group of traders to delegate authority to a single manager to trade in a 
specific stock for a specific period of time and then to share in the resulting profits or 
losses.  After a lengthy investigation, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee 
(1932-34) concluded that pools represented attempts to manipulate the prices of the 
chosen stocks. 
Other commentators provide colorful descriptions of the pools and their effects.  
Galbraith (1979, p. 79), for example, states that pools engaged in massive purchases in 
order to “increase prices and attract the interest of people watching the tape across the 
country. . . . If all went well, the public would come in to buy, and prices would rise on 
their own” enabling the pool to sell at a profit. 
Galbraith’s account suggests that rising volume caused a sustained price increase.  
Leffler and Farwell’s (1963, p. 459) treatise on the stock market makes the same point 
explicitly: 
A final device of the pool was artificial market activity.  This consisted of a heavy 
“churning” of the stock in the market; it was bought and sold by the pool in heavy 
volume. . . .  Its purpose was obvious to all familiar with pool operations.  The 
public must be attracted to the stock; few things attract speculators more quickly 
than a rising volume.  The public’s attitude became whetted in anticipation of 
“something big going on.”  It rushed in to buy before it was “too late.”  As the 
stock rose under increased activity, the public entered the market in ever 
increasing numbers; this was exactly the purpose of the operation. 
Some contemporary authors, however, describe pool participants as informed 
traders rather than manipulators.  Huebner (1934) and Pratt (1921) both argue that pool 
participants seek out undervalued stocks and purchase them quietly in order to profit 
from a later price rise.  Their description contrasts markedly from that of Galbraith or 
Leffler and Farwell, who depict pools as trying to draw attention to their large purchases 
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in order to generate interest in the stock.  Allen and Gale’s (1992) model distinguishes 
informed traders from uninformed large traders (manipulators).  Manipulators trade in 
their model in order to convince others that they are informed, which leads other traders 
to purchase after observing the manipulator’s purchases.  Similarly, in Jarrow’s (1992) 
model, small traders purchase after observing a sustained increase in the large trader’s 
holdings. 
Modern economists and lawyers have generally sided with Galbraith’s account, in 
which pools are manipulative and therefore pernicious.  Both Jarrow (1992) and Allen 
and Gale (1992) motivate their models with a discussion of famous examples of 
manipulation, including stock pools.  In a discussion of recent accounting scandals, 
Malkiel (2002) analogizes attempts to boost prices through earnings management to 
1920s-era market manipulation.  Legal treatises such as Loss and Seligman (1989) depict 
pools as successful manipulations. 
III.    Data and Characteristics of Pool Stocks 
A.  A Unique Data Set 
We use a new data set to examine the pre- and post-pool characteristics of the 
stocks that were subject to pools in the years 1928 and 1929.  To the best of our 
knowledge, we have assembled the first daily return and trading volume data for all 
NYSE stocks from 1927 to 1929.  Our sources for daily prices and volumes are the Wall 
Street Journal and New York Times.  The published prices are accompanied by a day-to-
day price change that is adjusted to account for dividends and other distributions.  Thus, 
discrepancies between the reported price change for day t, or ct, and the actual difference 
in reported prices, pt – pt-1, occur on ex-distribution days, and the time series ct can 
accordingly be used to calculate daily total returns.  As an added safeguard, we cross-
check those discrepancies against the distribution information contained in the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly data set. 
We also compute turnover and other measures of liquidity.  Our data set includes, 
for each day, the number of shares outstanding taken from the monthly CRSP data base.  
We calculate daily turnover, or trading volume divided by the number of shares 
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outstanding, as per Lo and Wang (2000).  We also calculate, for the relevant period, the 
percentage of days on which the stock did not trade.  No-trade days are not uncommon 
for U.S. equities during the 1920s.  Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003) use the 
proportion of trading days with no price change as a proxy for illiquidity.  Unlike that 
paper, we have daily trading volumes as well as daily price changes and accordingly use 
no-trade days as a more direct proxy for liquidity than no-price-change days. 
We also hand-collect the book value of common equity for each included stock, 
using accounting information from Moody’s manuals.  We define book value of common 
equity consistently with Fama and French (1993), although the diversity in accounting 
practices in the pre-SEC era complicates matters.  One important issue is that some 
companies accounted for depreciation, depletion and amortization on the asset side of the 
balance sheet as per current practice, while others created a reserve on the liability side.  
We calculate the book value of equity as the sum of the common stock account, earned 
and capital surplus, and long-term reserves not including any depreciation, depletion, 
and/or amortization reserves.  Because our goal is to model expected returns and not to 
test market efficiency, we update book values as of the balance sheet date, rather than 
with a lag as done in Fama and French (1993, 1995). 
Our sample of pool stocks is the same as in Mahoney (1999).  We begin with 
every stock named by the Senate as the subject of a pool in 1929 for which a starting 
date, τ, can be determined from the investigators’ records in the National Archives.  The 
starting date for pool i, τi, is the date of the written agreement relating to stock i.  We 
eliminate preferred stocks, mutual fund shares, and stocks that are not included in the 
CRSP data set in the month that includes the starting date.  The sample consists of 55 of 
the 107 stocks identified in the Senate’s report.  Most of the missing stocks are those for 
which we are unable to locate a pool agreement in the National Archives.  Table 1 lists 
the pool stocks and the corresponding pool formation dates. 
One reason to suspect informed trading is the frequent appearance of insiders as 
pool participants.  We cannot accurately measure how many pools included insiders 
because often the pool agreements we read redacted the signatories or only contained the 
first of multiple signature pages and did not otherwise list the participants.  However, 
even with that limitation, by cross-checking the names of pool participants, when 
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available, against the list of directors and officers contained in Moody’s Manuals, we can 
determine that at least 12 of the 55 pools in our sample included a corporate officer or 
director. 
Some of the pool agreements recite that the pool was formed to conduct a standby 
underwriting in connection with a rights offering or to engage in arbitrage between rights 
and the subject securities.  At the time, seasoned equity offerings were commonly 
conducted as rights offerings.  Returns on these stocks could be systematically different 
from the remainder of the sample even absent manipulation.  Several studies find that 
companies conducting seasoned equity offerings are overpriced at the time of the offering 
(Loughran and Ritter 1995; Pontiff and Schill 2002).  We accordingly construct 
subsamples consisting of pools formed within one month of a rights offering (based on 
the distribution information in the CRSP monthly file) and all others. 
 As a benchmark against which to compare realized returns and turnover on the 
pool stocks, we create industry-matched portfolios for each such stock.  We include in the 
portfolio for pool stock i every stock in the CRSP data set with the same 4-digit SIC code 
as i as of τi-1.2  We eliminate from the portfolios any stocks that were identified by the 
Senate’s investigation as the subject of pools but that are not included in our sample of 
pool stocks. 
B.  Pre-Pool Characteristics 
Aggarwal and Wu (2004) find that manipulators select stocks that are relatively 
small, illiquid, and volatile.  Table 2 compares the pool and industry-matched portfolios 
just prior to pool formation.  In the case of daily measures (return, turnover, and market 
capitalization), we calculate a time-series average (over the 60 trading days prior to pool 
formation) separately for each pool stock and each industry portfolio, then calculate 
descriptive statistics for the cross section of pools and portfolios.  For volatility and 
liquidity measures, we make the appropriate time-series calculation separately for each 
stock in the control portfolios, calculate the portfolio average, and then average that 
                                                 
2 For one of the pool stocks, there is no other stock with the same 4-digit SIC code.  In that case, the control 
portfolio consists of all stocks with a 2-digit SIC match. 
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measure over the 55 portfolios.  We also provide separate information on the rights 
offering stocks and the others. 
Unlike the manipulated stocks in Aggarwal and Wu’s sample, the pool stocks are 
similar to the industry portfolios on size measures, although they have slightly higher 
market-to-book ratios.  Interestingly, the pool stocks are substantially more liquid than 
the average stock in the matching portfolios.  The pool stocks, on average, failed to trade 
on 6.2% of the trading days in the pre-pool period, compared to 18.7% for the stocks in 
the control portfolios.  This is notable in light of Maug’s (2002) conclusion that informed 
trading is more profitable for more liquid stocks and provides additional reason to suspect 
that at least some pools were engaged in informed trading.  The pool stocks are more 
volatile on average than the stocks in the control portfolios, although most of the 
difference comes from the high pre-pool volatility of the rights offering stocks. 
The pre-pool returns for the pool stocks are lower than that of the industry stocks, 
although again most of the difference is attributable to the rights offering stocks, which 
have a negative average return over the period.  Average turnover is very similar between 
the pool stocks and associated portfolios. 
IV.   Returns and turnover during the pools 
The Senate’s investigators did not gather comprehensive information about the 
pool operators’ trades.  We therefore attempt to infer when the pools were trading by 
looking at abnormal turnover as well as abnormal returns.  We define an abnormal return 
for pool stock i on date t, ,i tAR , as , , ,
1
1 iK
i t i t j ti
jt
AR R R
K =
= − ∑ , where Kti is the number of 
stocks in the control portfolio corresponding to pool stock i for which there is a return on 
date t.  Cumulative abnormal returns are the sum of daily abnormal returns beginning on 
day -5 in event time.  Following Barber and Lyon (1997), for purposes of testing whether 
the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) on the pool stocks is different from 
zero, we estimate the standard deviation of the ACAR for date t as the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviation of cumulative abnormal returns for that date.  We define 
abnormal turnover and assess statistical significance analogously.   
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A.  Aggregate performance of pool stocks 
Figure 1 plots the average cumulative abnormal return and turnover for the pool 
stocks for the 60 trading days beginning with day -5 in event time.  The abnormal return 
results are consistent with those reported by Mahoney (1999).  The ACAR is positive 
throughout the period beginning at day -1 and reaches its peak very quickly.  It is also 
modest in size, averaging approximately 4%. It is easy to see that there is a positive 
relationship between ACAR and average cumulative abnormal turnover (ACAT) on days 
-5 through +2. The plot is consistent with a period of purchasing by the pool starting 
immediately at the time of pool formation, with perhaps some informational leakage just 
prior to formation.  This is, in turn, consistent with the “pumping” operation described in 
Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004), in which a manipulator purchases in large quantities, creating 
rising trading volume which is accompanied by rising prices.  In the plot, the apparent 
period of accumulation is followed by an additional period of abnormally high turnover, 
perhaps as a consequence of the pools liquidating their long positions.  We infer, 
therefore, that pools were net purchasers during approximately the period -5 to +2 in 
event time and net sellers during approximately the next 20 trading days.  
Table 3 provides additional information about the average performance of the 
pool stocks during the entire period of assumed pool activity, or days -5 to +24 in event 
time.  Average cumulative abnormal returns and turnover are significantly different from 
zero.  Consistent with Aggarwal and Wu’s (2004) sample of manipulated stocks, 
volatility and liquidity increase during the pool.  However, the initial price rise does not 
reverse during the period when we assume the pools were selling. 
The table also provides strong evidence that the rights offering pools are 
dissimilar to the remainder.  Most important, their turnover during the pool is abnormally 
low rather than abnormally high.  This is not surprising if these pools were largely 
engaged in standby underwritings.  If the distribution of shares in the rights offering 
(which would take place over the counter and not generate additional reported volume) 
was going smoothly, there would be little reason for the underwriters to trade. 
Finally, we look at extremes as well as averages.  The pools that traded most 
heavily may be the most likely to have engaged in manipulation and may also have had 
the greatest impact on policy.  The final column in Table 3 therefore analyzes the 10 
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pools with the largest cumulative abnormal turnover during the assumed 30-day period of 
pool activity.  Not surprisingly, these pools have a substantially larger average 
cumulative abnormal turnover than the remainder.  They also have substantially higher 
abnormal returns.  Interestingly, however, the pools did not significantly increase either 
volatility or liquidity for these stocks, which were on average more volatile and liquid 
than the remainder in the pre-pool period.  These results reinforce the lesson that the 
pools operated principally in stocks that were volatile but also highly liquid. 
 
B. Cross-sectional analysis of pool returns and turnover 
As the discussion above makes clear, there is substantial cross-sectional variation 
in return and turnover among the pool stocks.  Cumulative abnormal returns range from -
24% to +42%, while cumulative abnormal turnover ranges from -90% to +115%.  The 
averages could be hiding pools whose performance is more consistent with manipulation. 
An obvious initial question is whether abnormal turnover and abnormal return are 
correlated during the pool period.  Figure 2 is a scatter-plot of cumulative abnormal 
return against cumulative abnormal turnover during the period from day -5 to +24.  There 
is a clear positive relationship between abnormal turnover and abnormal return.  As 
shown in Table 4, the relationship is strengthened if we control for rights offerings.  The 
second column in Table 4 estimates the following regression: 
 
0 1 2 *i i i iCAR CAT RO CATβ β β= + +  ,   (1) 
 
where for each pool stock i, CARi is the 30-day cumulative abnormal return, CATi is the 
cumulative average turnover, and ROi equals one if the pool stock was the subject of a 
rights offering within a month of pool formation and zero otherwise.  For the rights 
offering stocks, there is a negative relationship between abnormal turnover and abnormal 
return.  One possible explanation is that underwriters purchased for stabilization purposes 
if the stock price declined during the offering, but did not trade if the stock price 
remained steady or increased.  Both results are strengthened if we restrict the analysis to 
the assumed “accumulation” period consisting of the 8 trading days beginning on day -5. 
Again, the cross-sectional results are consistent with the “pumping” operation described 
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in Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) where a deep-pocketed manipulator pushes the stock price 
up by making large purchases. Holding everything else constant, the more stock the 
manipulator purchases, the higher the trading volume and price. The results do not, 
however, rule out the possibility of informed trading. 
Another question is whether pool activity is associated with higher return 
volatility.  We estimate a regression similar to equation (1) but with volatility (the 
standard deviation of daily returns during the pool period) as the dependent variable.  We 
find no relationship, and the regression results are therefore not reported here. 
What factors led pool operators to be more or less active?  Again relying on the 
Aggarwal and Wu (2004) analysis, we would expect manipulation to be most probable in 
the case of smaller, more volatile, and less liquid stocks.  As shown in Table 5, however, 
pool operators did not trade more heavily in smaller and less liquid stocks.  Abnormal 
turnover during the pools is higher for stocks that were more volatile and had higher 
turnover prior to pool formation.  This suggests the possibility that pool operators were 
attracted by more speculative stocks (which could produce higher volatility and 
turnover).3  As expected, there is considerably less trading in the stocks that were subject 
to rights offerings than in the other pools. 
C. The Dynamic Return-Turnover Relationship During Pools 
This section describes a simple model designed to shed additional light on the 
effects of the pools’ trades.  Llorente, Michaely, Saar and Wang (2002, hereafter LMSW) 
model the dynamic volume-return relationship for individual stocks under different 
trading motives.  The model assumes that trades are motivated either by risk-sharing or 
information.  Returns generated by uninformed traders’ risk-sharing trades tend to 
reverse, whereas those generated by informed traders’ private information trades tend to 
continue.  The model cannot, however, distinguish between genuine informed trading and 
manipulation masquerading as informed trading. 
We will briefly describe the LMSW model while referring the interested reader to 
the LMSW paper.  The economy consists of two traded securities, a riskless bond and a 
                                                 
3 See Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) for a discussion of volatility and trading volume for stocks whose 
prices have a speculative component. 
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stock, and a non-traded asset.  The bond is in unlimited supply at a constant and non-
negative interest rate. Each investor maximizes expected (exponential) utility conditional 
on his information set.  Investors trade for two reasons.  Uninformed investors trade to 
hedge risk by changing their holdings of the risky asset in response to changes in their 
holdings of the non-traded asset.  Informed investors make hedging trades, but also trade 
to take advantage of their private information. After solving for the equilibrium price 
process, LMSW note that expected returns in period t+1 depend on the volume of trade 
in period t and provide the following (approximate) dynamic return-volume relationship:4 
 
1 1 2,t t t t t tE R R V C R C V R+  = +  ,   (2) 
 
where Rt is return in time period t and Vt is trading volume during period t. An important 
implication of the model is that returns generated by informed trades tend to continue, 
while returns generated by hedging trades tend to reverse.  Note that in equation (2), C1 
provides the unconditional first-order return autocorrelation.  The sign of C2, then, 
indicates whether returns are positively or negatively autocorrelated, conditional on 
volume.  Hedging trades should be followed by return reversal, leading to a negative C2.  
Informed trades, by contrast, should be followed by return continuation, leading to a 
positive C2. 
We estimate a variant of the LMSW model that tests the association between 
abnormal turnover and the autocorrelation of abnormal returns.  We use an additional 
interaction among prior-day abnormal turnover and return, and the presence of a pool.  
The intuition follows from the Jarrow (1992), Allen and Gale (1992), Aggarwal and Wu 
(2004) and Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) models of successful manipulation, each of which 
implies short-term return continuance in the presence of a manipulator.  Specifically, we 
estimate the following approximation of the LMSW model for stock i over the period 
prior to and during pool operations: 
 
                                                 
4 More precisely, the model relates returns to normalized volume and approximates the relationship using a 
Taylor series expansion of the resulting formula.  For empirical purposes, however, LMSW simplify by 
relating returns to detrended log volume. 
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, 1 0 1 , 2 , , 3 , , , , 1.
p
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tAR AR AR AV AR AV Dβ β β β ε+ += + + + +   (3) 
 
where ARi,t and AVi,t are the abnormal return and turnover, respectively, for stock i on 
date t, and ptiD ,  is a dummy variable that equals 1 after pool formation and zero before 
pool formation. 
The coefficient β3 in equation 3 is of particular interest, as it captures the 
incremental abnormal return continuation (reversal), conditional on abnormal volume, 
during the pool period.   Given a positive β2, a positive β3 would be consistent with either 
informed trading or manipulation due to pool trading.  It could be a consequence of an 
increase in informed trading during the pool or evidence of a manipulator mimicking an 
informed trader.  A negative β3 would be evidence against either informed or 
manipulative trading and would suggest that pools traded for liquidity reasons. 
We estimate the model for the period beginning on day -65 and continuing 
through the presumed “accumulation” period ending on day +2.  Those results are shown 
in Table 6.  The estimated coefficient β2 is positive and significant, suggesting a generally 
high degree of informed trading for pool stocks.  The estimated coefficient β3 is also 
positive and significant, suggesting that the pools engaged either in genuine informed 
trading or manipulation masquerading as informed trading. 
The magnitude of the β3 coefficient falls as we re-estimate the model to 
encompass a longer time period after the commencement of the pool.  For example, 
extending the sample period to day +10 produces a β3 of 0.34 (p<.01), compared to 0.45 
as in Table 6.  Extending the sample period all the way through the assumed end of pool 
operations, or day +24, produces a β3 of 0.11, which is no longer significantly different 
from zero.  This provides additional reason to believe that the pools’ purchases were 
concentrated in a brief period around the time of signing the pool agreement.  Table 6 
also shows separate results for the rights offering stocks and the remainder.  It is notable 
that only the latter group experiences increased return continuation conditional on 
volume during the existence of a pool. 
While the results for individual stocks are generally insignificant and are not 
reported, there are few statistically significant estimated coefficients on the individual 
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pool stocks.5  On average, the rights offering stocks have a negative estimated β3 and, in 
one case, it is significant at the 1% level.  Two pool stocks have an estimated β3 that is 
positive and significant at the 5% level.  One of these, Radio Corp. of America, had 
substantial insider participation.  The company was engaged in merger negotiations that 
were revealed shortly after the pool began, creating an obvious suspicion of insider 
trading (Mahoney 1999).  The other pool traded in Standard Oil of California and 
consisted of a brokerage house and Herbert Fleishhacker, who controlled the Anglo-
American Bank (Standard Oil’s transfer agent) and several energy companies in San 
Francisco, where Standard Oil was headquartered.6  Shortly after the formation of the 
pool on March 15, 1929, Standard Oil’s price surged.  Articles in the New York Times 
and Wall Street Journal on March 20 noted that the major oil companies had 
simultaneously and substantially raised gasoline prices in San Francisco and Los 
Angeles, signaling the end of a damaging price war. Once again, insider trading seems 
plausible. 
V.  The long-term performance of the pool stocks 
The connection between trading volume and price changes during pools is 
consistent with models of successful manipulation and with informal descriptions of 
“pump and dump” schemes.  However, the average magnitude of the abnormal returns is 
modest and there is no indication that these returns are reversed after the accumulation 
period ends.  We therefore also consider the pool stocks’ long-run performance.  If, as in 
the traditional account, pools purchased to create price momentum and then sold 
overpriced stocks to gullible investors, these investors would eventually discover that the 
stocks were overvalued and the returns would be reversed. 
Fortunately, there are some obvious eye-opening events after our period of 
interest—the October 1929 market crash and the Depression.  The literature on the pools 
explicitly or implicitly concludes that the pool stocks, inflated by manipulative trading, 
realized greater losses than non-manipulated stocks during the market crash and 
                                                 
5 We use a period ending on day +10 for these individual regressions in order to boost the power of the 
tests.  These results are available upon request. 
6 Fleishhacker was also socially prominent in San Francisco.  A Google search reveals that he is known as 
the “father of the San Francisco zoo.” 
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Depression. While Mahoney (1999) examined the possibility of short-term (six months) 
price reversal for pool stocks, he did not study their performance over a longer period. 
We accordingly compare cumulative buy-and-hold monthly returns from 
September 1, 1929 through December 31, 1939, inclusive, on 54 pool stocks versus their 
industry-matched portfolios.  One of the 55 pool stocks merged with one of its matched 
stocks shortly before the crash and is excluded from the sample. 
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the long-run returns on the pool stocks 
and control portfolios.  The pool stocks underperform their control portfolios during the 
decade that begins just before the crash.  However, that underperformance is attributable 
entirely to the stocks that were the subject of rights offerings (which, as we have shown, 
did not experience unusually high trading volumes or returns during the pools).  Returns 
on the remaining stocks very closely match their industries.  Thus, even over a decade, 
the abnormal returns experienced during pool operations were not reversed. 
We also look at the relative performance of the stocks traded by the most active 
pools, as defined in Table 3.  These pool stocks underperform their industry portfolios, 
but by an insignificant amount.  This again highlights the substantial cross-sectional 
variation in the pool stocks’ long-run performance, and we accordingly test to see 
whether the differences are best explained by the pool’s trading or by factors existing 
prior to the pool.  Table 8 shows the results of regressions using long-term buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (that is, the difference between the pool and control portfolio returns) as 
the dependent variable.  The first column includes only pre-pool characteristics of the 
stocks, including market-to-book ratio, average daily abnormal returns, average daily 
abnormal turnover, and volatility during a 60-day pre-pool period, and the standardized 
β2 coefficient, which is a measure of informational asymmetry during the same pre-pool 
period.  We also include an indicator for rights offerings. 
The results show that measures suggesting overvaluation prior to the pool are 
related to long-run underperformance.  Stocks that had a higher pre-pool market-to-book 
ratio or that experienced large abnormal returns prior to the pool have lower long-run 
abnormal returns.  Consistent with modern evidence, stocks that are the subject of 
seasoned equity (rights) offerings have lower long-term performance.  High 
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informational asymmetry in the pre-pool period is also associated with inferior long-term 
performance. 
The remaining columns add additional variables measuring the effects of the pool, 
including abnormal return, abnormal turnover, and volatility during the pool, as well as 
the standardized β3 coefficient.  None of the new variables enters significantly and their 
inclusion has almost no effect on the predictive power of the model. 
The overall picture, then, is dramatically at odds with the traditional account of 
the pools.  On average, the existence of a pool makes no difference in the long-term 
performance of the subject stock and only a modest (and positive) difference in the short-
run returns.  Looking at the pool stocks individually, only one (Studebaker Automobile 
Corp.) is a strong candidate for a finding of trade-based manipulation based on a large 
increase in trading volume, a substantial abnormal short-run return, and an increase in 
return autocorrelation conditioned on volume during the pool, and long-run 
underperformance after the pool.  The weakness in the case is that Studebaker’s monthly 
returns are very similar to its industry’s until 1933-35, when it experienced financial 
distress and then bankruptcy while the remainder of the automobile industry began to 
recover.  
A plausible solution to the puzzle is that some of the pools were engaged in 
genuine informed trading.  This would (as in the LMSW model) explain the increased 
volume and price in the short term as well as the unexceptional long-term performance of 
the pool stocks.  It also meshes with the frequent presence of corporate insiders as pool 
participants.  The rights offering pools, by contrast, do not present a puzzle—they seem 
to have been engaged in normal merchant banking services. 
Even if the pool operators subjectively intended to drive prices from their 
fundamental levels, there is no evidence that they succeeded.  This is notable because 
Congress devoted substantial time, money, and investigative expertise to finding 
instances of successful manipulation.  This, by any reasonable interpretation of our data, 
it failed to do.  Thus, either Congress’s investigators did a poor job or manipulation was 
not a substantial problem on the New York Stock Exchange in the late 1920s. 
Currently, legal proceedings against manipulators arise principally in two 
circumstances.  One involves futures markets in a commodity or financial instrument that 
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can be cornered around the time of delivery, as described by Merrick, Naik and Yadav 
(2003).  The other involves stocks traded in relatively inefficient markets such as the 
“pink sheets” in the United States or the stock markets of emerging-market countries 
(Aggarwal & Wu, 2004).  It would be useful to understand how the risk of manipulation 
varies with the size and liquidity of the subject company. 
From that perspective, we note that exchange-listed companies in the 1920s were 
dramatically different from today.  The median market capitalization of a listed firm on 
the NYSE in 1929 was on the order of $30 million and the median number of shares 
traded for a listed company on a typical day was in the hundreds.  Yet the size and 
liquidity of these companies, coupled with the NYSE’s own disclosure requirements, 
seem to have been sufficient to make successful manipulation rare.  Of course, the 
amount of capital available to a would-be manipulator was smaller as well, so we cannot 
say that it would be impossible to manipulate stocks issued by similarly-sized companies 
today.  Nevertheless, our results, coupled with those of other studies, suggest that 
successful trade-based manipulation is difficult for all but the smallest and most illiquid 
companies.  Alternatively, the level of financial disclosure may be as or more important 
than size and liquidity per se.  Mahoney (1997) describes the NYSE’s pre-SEC disclosure 
and anti-manipulation rules.  The exchange required financial disclosures and, as a means 
of preventing market corners, it also prohibited wash sales and other fraudulent trades 
that could be used to manipulate prices. 
Our results also lend support to the SEC’s 1997 decision to relax certain anti-
manipulation rules.  For many years, the SEC’s so-called “trading rules” prohibited most 
share purchases by an issuer or underwriter during a public offering of the same class of 
shares.  In 1997, however, the SEC ended many of these restrictions for stocks with a 
public float in excess of $150 million and an average daily trading volume in excess of $1 
million.  Those levels could perhaps be reduced without creating any significant risk of 
manipulation. 
VI. Conclusion 
The stock pools are an important part of the historical justification for the federal 
securities laws’ anti-manipulation provisions.  They also provide part of the motivation 
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for several prominent theoretical models of successful manipulation.  There is, however, 
scant evidence on pool operations and their impact on stock liquidity, volatility, and 
pricing.  
This paper assembles a new data set by hand-collecting daily price and trading 
volume data as well as book value from 1920s. By comparing pool stocks with industry 
matched portfolios, we find several important differences between pool operations and 
acknowledged instances of successful manipulation.  Unlike the small and illiquid stocks 
studied by Aggarwal and Wu (2004), the average pool stock is of comparable size and 
more liquid than other companies in its industry.  There are also important differences 
among the pool stocks.  Stocks associated with rights offering pools do not experience 
abnormally high trading volume or price appreciation. 
We also find some facts that are consistent with manipulation, but also with 
informed trading.  Pool stocks display increased return continuation conditional on high 
trading volume.  In the short run, abnormal returns are positively associated with trading 
volume for pool stocks, consistent with price manipulation in the Mei, Wu, and Zhou 
(2004) model.  Nevertheless, we fail to find evidence that the pools caused abnormal 
performance during the market crash and Depression. The long-term performance of pool 
stocks is closely associated with valuation and turnover prior to pool formation but is not 
associated with measurable aspects of the pool operations.  
As Mahoney (1999) notes, the New Deal-era Congress had substantial motivation 
and desire to uncover manipulation on the New York Stock Exchange from the late 
1920s.  Its investigators concluded that the pools presented the strongest case.  In light of 
our findings, either manipulation was not a significant problem on the exchange or the 
investigators focused on the wrong phenomenon.  One plausible conclusion is that the 
size, liquidity, and information disclosure of exchange-listed companies in the 1920s was 
sufficient to make manipulation difficult.  This, in turn, suggests that regulatory resources 
may be safely focused on situations where those factors are not all present. 
Our forensic analysis provides useful tools to researchers of market manipulation. 
Recent studies, such as Khwaja and Mian (2003) and Wu (2004), suggest that 
manipulation could still be quite prevalent in emerging markets. The tools developed in 
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this paper could aid in the discovery and prosecution of these cases and help evaluate the 
effectiveness of regulatory systems in stamping out manipulation.  
Our paper has left several issues unstudied. First, it might be interesting to 
analyze other aspects of liquidity such as the bid-ask spread during pool operations.  A 
separate inquiry is whether the liquidity shock during pool operations was temporary or 
permanent.  Aggarwal and Wu (2004) find that manipulated stocks experience improved 
long-term liquidity.  Surprisingly, then, even successful trade-based manipulation may 
confer benefits that would have to be weighed against the resulting costs.  These issues 
will require additional collection of historical data, which we will leave to an ongoing 
study. 
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Table 1 
Pool Stock Sample 
Company Name Pool Formation Date
Bush Terminal 1/17/1928
May Deptartment Stores 1/17/1928
St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. 3/9/1928
Simms Petroleum 3/31/1928
Curtis Aeroplane Co. 4/3/1928
Munsingwear 4/26/1928
South Porto Rico Sugar 5/15/1928
Cerro de Pasco 5/21/1928
Consolidated Cigar 6/4/1928
Pillsbury Flour Mills 6/16/1928
R.H. Macy & Co. 7/17/1928
Childs & Co. 8/18/1928
Continental Can Co. 8/30/1928
Kroger Grocery 10/30/1928
Underwood Elliott Fisher Co. 10/30/1928
American Sugar Refining Co. 11/8/1928
Weber & Heilbroner 11/15/1928
National Dairy Co. 11/19/1928
Mid Continental Petroleum Co. 11/21/1928
Congress Cigar Co. 12/3/1928
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 12/12/1928
General Cigar Co. 12/17/1928
Lehn & Fink Products 12/21/1928
Cluett Peabody Co. 12/27/1928
Marmon Motor Co. 1/14/1929
Studebaker 1/14/1929
Borden Co. 1/18/1929
Gotham Silk Hosiery 1/30/1929
Gimbel Brothers 2/2/1929
Miami Copper 2/5/1929
General Cable 2/15/1929
Packard Motor Co. 2/15/1929
General Refractories 2/27/1929
Walworth Co. 2/27/1929
Radio Corporation of America 3/7/1929
Bethlehem Steel 3/15/1929
Standard Oil of California 3/15/1929
Purity Bakeries 3/26/1929
Oppenheim Collins Co. 4/12/1929
International Telephone & Telegraph 5/2/1929
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A. G. Spalding & Brothers 5/8/1929
Murray Corporation of America 5/26/1929
Pittsburgh & West Virginia. R.R. 5/27/1929
Spang Chalfante Co. 7/9/1929
Gold Dust Corp. 7/10/1929
American Ice 8/8/1929
Telautograph 8/12/1929
General American Tank Car Co. 8/20/1929
Campbell Wyant Foundry Co. 8/21/1929
American Commercial Alcohol 8/30/1929
Archer Daniels Midland Corp. 8/30/1929
L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. 9/10/1929
Missouri, Kansas & Texas R.R. 9/26/1929
Chrysler Co. 10/17/1929
Columbia Carbon Co. 10/30/1929
 
The list of pool stocks is from Senate Stock Exchange Practices hearings (also known as 
the Pecora Hearings), Part 17, p. 7949.  The formation dates are obtained from the 
records of the Pecora investigation contained in the National Archives. 
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TABLE 2 
Pool stocks and industry-matched control portfolios prior to pool formation 
 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are shown for return, turnover, size, volatility and liquidity measures for the 55 pool 
stocks and 55 industry-matched control portfolios over 60 trading days ending 6 days prior to the formation of the pools (days -65 
through -6 in event time).  Each pool stock is paired with a control portfolio consisting of all companies with the same 4-digit SIC 
code (in one case there is no 4-digit SIC match and the portfolio consists of all companies with the matching 2-digit SIC code).  Daily 
return, turnover, market capitalization, book value, and market-to-book ratio are averaged over the event period for each stock and 
portfolio.  The standard deviation of daily returns for each pool stock is calculated for the time series of returns during the sample 
period.  The corresponding measure for a control portfolio is the average of the time-series standard deviations for the individual 
stocks in the portfolio.  Trading days with no transactions is the number of days during the event period that a particular stock did not 
trade.  The corresponding measure for a control portfolio is the average for the individual stocks in the portfolio. 
 
  
Pool 
stocks 
 
Control 
portfolios 
Pool stocks 
excluding rights 
offerings 
Control portfolios 
excluding rights 
offerings 
Pool stocks (rights 
offerings only) 
Control portfolios 
(rights offerings 
only) 
N 55 47 8 
Daily return (%) 0.081 (0.330) 
0.151 
(0.202) 
0.112 
(0.248) 
0.151 
(0.206) 
-0.105 
(0.624) 
0.151 
(0.187) 
Daily turnover (%) 0.767 (0.744) 
0.841 
(0.580) 
0.797 
(0.788) 
0.805 
(0.514) 
0.587 
(0.383) 
1.049 
(0.895) 
Market capitalization 
($ millions) 
94.3 
(156.6) 
92.7 
(184.1) 
85.6 
(150.7) 
99.0 
(197.8) 
145.7 
(190.9) 
56.0 
(49.8) 
Book value of equity 
($ millions) 
48.9 
(88.5) 
59.1 
(137.5) 
49.8 
(92.8) 
65.1 
(148.0) 
43.4 
(61.6) 
23.5 
(16.6) 
Market-to-book ratio 2.43 (2.39) 
2.19 
(1.35) 
2.12 
(2.35) 
2.15 
(1.41) 
4.20* 
(1.91) 
2.42 
(0.886) 
Standard deviation of 
daily return (%) 
2.20** 
(0.891) 
1.85 
(0.903) 
2.08* 
(0.723) 
1.80 
(0.837) 
2.95 
(1.39) 
2.21 
(1.23) 
Trading days with no 
transactions (%) 
6.18*** 
(14.6) 
18.7 
(16.6) 
5.10*** 
(9.93) 
17.9 
(14.5) 
12.5 
(30.7) 
23.3 
(26.6) 
 
*, **, *** pool stock and control portfolio means are different at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 27
TABLE 3 
 
Characteristics of pool stocks during pool operations 
 
All measures are for the period from day -5 to +24 in event time, except as otherwise 
noted.  The measure of volatility is the standard deviation of daily nominal returns.  The 
measure of liquidity is the percentage of days with no trading; a positive number 
indicates fewer such days.  The change in volatility and liquidity is calculated with 
respect to a pre-pool period consisting of days -64 to -6.  Standard errors are calculated as 
the cross-sectional standard deviation divided by the square root of the sample size. 
 
Measure All 
pools 
Excluding 
rights offerings 
Rights 
offerings only 
Most 
active 
n 55 47 8 10 
Average cumulative abnormal return, 
days -5 to +2 
4.14*** 
(0.96) 
4.79*** 
(0.95) 
0.31 
(3.38) 
9.56*** 
(1.87) 
Average cumulative abnormal turnover, 
days -5 to +2 
5.40*** 
(1.44) 
7.36*** 
(1.40) 
-6.08 
(3.57) 
19.92*** 
(2.39) 
Average cumulative abnormal return 3.79** 
(1.62) 
3.70** 
(1.81) 
4.34 
(3.56) 
11.06** 
(3.89) 
Average cumulative abnormal turnover 11.65** 
(4.96) 
17.64*** 
(4.97) 
-23.55* 
(12.01) 
72.46*** 
(8.63) 
Change in volatility from pre-pool period 0.61** 
(0.25) 
0.49*** 
(0.18) 
1.27 
(1.40) 
0.51 
(0.28) 
Change in liquidity (decrease in no-trade 
days) from pre-pool period 
2.12* 
(1.20) 
1.77* 
(0.91) 
4.17 
(6.58) 
0.17 
(0.52) 
 
*,**,***: significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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TABLE 4 
 
Regressions: Pool Abnormal Turnover and Abnormal Return 
 
The dependent variable in both regressions is cumulative abnormal return on each of the 
55 pool stocks during the period of pool operations, which we assume to be days -5 to 
+24 in event time.  The variable “Rights” is an indicator that equals one for stocks that 
were the subject of rights offerings within one month of pool formation and zero for all 
other stocks. 
 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) 2.41 
(1.60) 
1.17 
(1.71) 
Cumulative abnormal turnover 0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
Rights * Cumulative abnormal turnover  -0.21* 
(0.12) 
Adjusted R-square .12 .15 
 
*, **, *** significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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TABLE 5 
 
Regression: Abnormal Turnover and Pre-pool Characteristics 
 
The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal turnover for each of the 55 pool stocks 
during the period of pool operations, which we assume to be days -5 to +24 in event time.  
Market capitalization and market-to-book ratio are measured for each pool stock on day -
6.  Pre-pool volatility and abnormal turnover are measured over the period from day -65 
to -6. 
 
 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) -12.9 
(13.2) 
-21.7* 
(11.9) 
Market capitalization 0.005 
(0.033) 
0.009 
(0.029) 
Market-to-book ratio -1.01 
(2.19) 
0.812 
(2.00) 
Volatility prior to pool 6.46 
(6.32) 
12.7** 
(5.85) 
Abnormal turnover prior to pool 18.7** 
(7.08) 
14.9** 
(6.37) 
No-trade days prior to pool -31.6 
(39.3) 
-28.5 
(34.9) 
Rights offering -49.5*** 
(13.2) 
  
Adj. R2 = 0.29 .134 .317 
 
*,**,*** significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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TABLE 6 
 
Regressions: Abnormal Return Continuation and Abnormal Turnover 
 
This table presents an estimation of the LMSW model for stock i over the period from 
days -65 to +2: 
, 1 0 1 , 2 , , 3 , , , , 1.
p
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tAR AR AR AV AR AV Dβ β β β ε+ += + + + +   (3). 
 
where ARi,t and AVi,t are the abnormal return and turnover, respectively, for stock i on 
date t, and ptiD ,  is a dummy variable that equals 1 after pool formation and zero before 
pool formation. The equation is jointly estimated for all pool stocks. 
 
 β0 β1 β2 β3 Adj. R2 
Entire sample 
0.010 
(0.049) 
-0.093*** 
(0.018) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.045*** 
(0.013) 
0.013 
Rights offering stocks 
only 
-0.017 
(0.177) 
-0.074 
(0.046) 
0.074* 
(0.042) 
0.019 
(0.054) 
0.025 
Excluding rights 
offering stocks 
0.021 
(0.050) 
-0.091*** 
(0.019) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.037*** 
(0.014) 
0.009 
 
*, **, *** significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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TABLE 7 
 
Long-run returns on pool and industry-matched stocks 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics for cumulative buy-and-hold monthly returns (in %) 
on 54 pool stocks and 54 industry-matched portfolios during the period September 1, 
1929 through December 31, 1939. 
 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
Pool Stocks -40.79 399.86 -100 80.59 
Control portfolios -23.74 524.15 -91.98 88.37 
     
Pool stocks excluding rights 
offerings -38.38 399.86 -100 84.45 
Control portfolios excl. rights 
offerings -38.34 71.7 -91.98 37.8 
     
Pool stocks (rights offerings only) -56.96 32.22 -99.25 48.49 
Control Portfolios (rights offerings 
only) 74.29 524.15 -66.12 212.49 
     
10 most active pools -62.92 63.82 -100 51.78 
Control portfolios -57.31 -30.48 -87.93 20.12 
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TABLE 8 
 
Regressions: Long-term abnormal returns versus pre-pool and pool characteristics 
 
The dependent variable is the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return on each pool 
stock for the period September 1929 through December 1939.  Abnormal returns are 
calculated as the monthly difference between the return on the pool stock and its 
associated industry portfolio.  The estimated β2 and β3 coefficients are taken from the 
regressions reported in Table 6.  Pre-pool abnormal return, abnormal turnover, and 
volatility are calculated from days -64 to -6, and the same variables during the pool are 
calculated from days -5 to +24. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
(Constant) -54.24 
(40.59) 
-54.84 
(41.21) 
-51.77 
(40.63) 
-55.31 
(40.99) 
-50.45 
(40.47) 
-51.91 
(41.68) 
Pre-pool market-to-
book 
-13.34** 
(6.13) 
-13.33** 
(6.20) 
-15.40** 
(6.44) 
-13.43** 
(6.18) 
-13.07** 
(6.10) 
-15.14** 
(6.69) 
Pre-pool cumulative 
abnormal return 
-149.12*** 
(43.41) 
-147.71*** 
(44.85) 
-156.52*** 
(43.96) 
-151.71*** 
(44.11) 
-145.83*** 
(43.24) 
-149.46*** 
(45.60) 
Pre-pool cumulative 
abnormal turnover 
7.61 
(18.96) 
7.42 
(19.20) 
-4.40 
(22.21) 
8.56 
(19.23) 
-0.49 
(19.94) 
-10.93 
(24.52) 
Pre-pool volatility 38.22* 
(19.73) 
38.81* 
(20.32) 
34.07* 
(20.12) 
33.94 
(21.84) 
39.06* 
(19.63) 
34.77 
(22.32) 
Standardized β2 -92.74*** 
(34.30) 
-92.14** 
(34.89) 
-90.33** 
(34.35) 
-89.83** 
(35.13) 
-171.28** 
(71.60) 
-148.20* 
(77.19) 
Rights offering -129.84*** 
(42.51) 
-130.39*** 
(43.116) 
-111.23** 
(46.12) 
-131.99*** 
(43.11) 
-139.72*** 
(43.00) 
-122.77** 
(50.23) 
Cumulative abnormal 
return during pool 
 -.164 
(1.11) 
   -0.703 
(1.277) 
Cumulative abnormal 
turnover during pool 
  0.56 
(0.54) 
  0.553 
(0.662) 
Volatility during pool    3.82 
(8.07) 
 2.211 
(8.368) 
Standardized β3     -92.47 
(74.13) 
-73.02 
(79.14) 
Adjusted R-square .313 .298 .314 .301 .321 .289 
 
*, **, *** significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
 33
FIGURE 1 
 
Cumulative average abnormal return and turnover on pool stocks 
 
Abnormal return (turnover) is the difference between the return (turnover) on the pool stock and the industry-matched portfolio. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Cumulative abnormal return versus cumulative abnormal turnover for pool stocks 
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Cumulative abnormal returns and turnover are measured for each of the 55 pool stocks beginning on day -5 and ending on day +24 in 
event time, with day 0 the day on which the pool agreement began. 
